Models for fare planning in public transport  by Borndörfer, Ralf et al.
Discrete Applied Mathematics 160 (2012) 2591–2605
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Discrete Applied Mathematics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/dam
Models for fare planning in public transport✩
Ralf Borndörfer a,∗, Marika Karbstein a,∗, Marc E. Pfetsch b
a Zuse Institute Berlin, Takustr. 7, 14195 Berlin, Germany
b Institute for Mathematical Optimization, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Pockelsstraße 14, 38106 Braunschweig, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 17 March 2010
Received in revised form 6 December 2011
Accepted 22 February 2012
Available online 16 March 2012
Keywords:
Fare planning
Public transit
Nonlinear optimization
a b s t r a c t
The optimization of fare systems in public transit allows to pursue objectives such as
the maximization of demand, revenue, profit, or social welfare. We propose a nonlinear
optimization approach to fare planning that is based on a detailed discrete choice model
of user behavior. The approach allows to analyze different fare structures, optimization
objectives, and operational scenarios involving, e.g., subsidies.We use the resultingmodels
to compute optimized fare systems for the city of Potsdam, Germany.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Fares are a direct and flexible instrument to influence passenger behavior and cost recovery of a public transport
system. Setting fares is therefore a fundamental problem for any mass transit company or authority. The importance of
this task is further increased by technological progress such as the introduction of electronic ticketing systems, which offer
opportunities to implement versatile fare structures.
Public transport fares are well investigated in the economic literature. They are often studied from a macroscopic point
of view in terms of elasticities, equilibrium conditions, and marginal cost analyses in order to derive qualitative insights;
see, e.g., [22,20,7,11,21]. The articles by Nash [18] and Glaister and Collings [10] proposed to treat the setting of fares as
an optimization problem, namely, to maximize objectives such as revenue, passenger miles, or social welfare subject to a
budget constraint. Nash [18] uses an elasticity based demand function to compute peak and off-peak prices. Glaister and
Collings [10] set up a linear demand function (whose slope is derived from typical elasticity values) in order to calculate
fares for different modes (e.g., bus and rail traffic), solve the first order conditions of their model numerically for different
elasticities and levels of the budget constraint, and report on implementations of the results at London Transport. More
details were added in the approaches of Kocur and Hendrickson [13] and De Borger et al. [8]. The first authors propose a
‘‘local area analysis’’ on an infinitely fine rectangular street grid in order to ‘‘makemore explicit trade offs amongproductivity
increases, service changes, and fare policy’’. The second authors address the problem to compute ‘‘all relevantmarginal social
costs’’.
With regard to demand models, the theory of discrete choice has emerged as a viable approach to predict the behavior
of passengers of a public transport system; see [3,16]. Empirical studies give evidence that travel choice is governed by a
number of factors, most notably travel time, availability of a car and of discounted long term tickets, and fares; see [1,28].
Many of these factors depend on the network structure. It therefore makes sense to combine detailed models of passenger
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behavior and network fare optimization. We proposed a basic approach of this type in the articles [5,19], maximizing the
revenue subject to a constant service level. Advanced bilevel logit models based on a similar idea have been introduced by
Lam and Zhou [15].
Going one step further, we show in this paper how a number of objectives and constraints of practical relevance, in
particular with respect to costs, can be formulated and that the resulting models can be solved by nonlinear optimization
techniques. We apply these methods to optimize fares for the city of Potsdam in Germany. Our results show that the
structure of the network does indeed influence the behavior of the passengers, i.e., we demonstrate a ‘‘network effect’’ in fare
planning. For example, passengers with identical travel timesmake different choices according to the relative attractiveness
of the car.
Problems that are related to, but are different from, public transit fare optimization include toll optimization resp. road
and congestion pricing, see, e.g., [14,27,6,25,24]. Nagurney and Qiang [17] discuss (car) travel behavior in the presence of
degradable network links. Public transport tariff zone design is investigated by Hamacher and Schöbel [12].
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the fare planning problem.We propose a discrete choice demand
model in Section 2.1 and a family of five fare optimizationmodels in Section 2.2. Themodels address the following objectives
and constraints:
◦ Max-R is a basic model; it assumes a fixed level of service and maximizes revenue.
◦ Max-P includes costs that depend on line operation frequencies and subsidies; the objective is to maximize the profit.
◦ Max-Dmaximizes the demand, i.e., the number of public transport passengers, subject to budget and capacity constraints.
◦ Max-Bmaximizes the user benefit subject to budget and capacity constraints.
◦ Max-Smaximizes social welfare subject to capacity constraints.
The models are calibrated in Section 2.3 and used to compute and analyze fare systems for the city of Potsdam in Section 3.
Solving the models numerically, we show that different fare systems can be compared and evaluated in a quantitative way
and that fare systems can be designed and optimized in order to achieve the goals specified above. As far as we know, an
optimization and an analysis at this level of detail has not been done before in the context of public transit fares.
2. Fare planing
The fare planning problem involves a public transportation network, i.e., a directed graph G = (V , E), where the nodes
V represent stations and the arcs E connections that can be used for traveling. There is a set D ⊆ V × V of origin–destination
pairs (OD-pairs or traffic relations) between which passengers want to travel. We assume fixed passenger routes, i.e., for
every OD-pair (s, t) there is a unique directed path Pst through the network that the passengers will take when using public
transport, and we further assume that this path is a time-minimal path. In the upcoming models, time-minimal paths are
also cost-minimal, since travel time, distance, and price correlate. We remark that themodel complexity is unchanged if the
travel path depends on the alternative, and that considering several paths (e.g., to model different user groups) leads to a
linear increase in size.
Furthermore, we are given a finite set A of travel alternatives that the passengers can choose for individual trips. Examples
of travel alternatives that we have inmind are using public transport with a particular (single, monthly, distance dependent,
etc.) ticket or traveling by a privately owned car (non-public transport). We assume an upper bound N on the maximum
number of trips during some time horizon T of interest (e.g., at most N = 60 trips during T = 30 days), and denote by
C = A×{1, . . . ,N} a set of possible travel choices for all trips during T . A travel choice is a travel alternative combined with
the actual number of trips during the time horizon, e.g., 30 trips with a monthly ticket during a month. We assume in our
definition of travel choices that passengers do not mix alternatives for their trips, i.e., the same travel alternative is chosen
for all trips in the time horizon T . We denote by A′ ⊂ A and by C ′ ⊂ C the travel alternatives and travel choices associated
with public transport.
We consider price functions pist : Rn+ → R+ and demand functions dist : Rn+ → R+ for each OD-pair (s, t) ∈ D and each
travel choice i ∈ C. Price and demand functions depend on nonnegative fare variables x1, . . . , xn, which we call fares. A fare
vector is a vector x ∈ Rn+ of fares.
A price function pist(x) determines the price for traveling with travel choice i from s to t depending on the fare vector
x. Examples of prices and fares are: a distance tariff depending on a price per kilometer of travel, a zone tariff depending
on a price for crossing a zone, etc. All pist appearing in this paper are affine functions and hence differentiable. The price
functions for travel choices not using public transport do not depend on fares and are therefore constant for every fixed
OD-pair.
For a real-world illustration consider the Dutch intercity railway system of Nederland Spoorwegen Reizigers (NSR). The
left side of Fig. 1 shows the price for a single trip as a function of trip distance. The trip price is given by a piece-wise
linear function, consisting of three pieces. Piece j, j = 1, . . . , 3, can be described in terms of two parameters: a slope xd,j
and an intercept xB,j. These parameters form the vector (xd,1, xB,1, xd,2, xB,2, xd,3, xB,3) of fare variables. Variable xd,j can be
interpreted as a distance dependent price component, while xB,j plays the role of a base price. These are the parameters
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Fig. 1. Cheapest prices (2004) for a single trip (left) in the Dutch intercity network (right).
that we want to optimize. For every OD-pair (s, t), we consider a travel choice (T , k) for k trips a month, say, using a single
ticket T . Depending on the length ℓst of the travel path Pst , the price for a single ticket is calculated according to piece j = jst ,
and the price function for k trips is
pT ,kst (x) := k · (xB,j + xd,j · ℓst).
With respect to the fare variables, this price function is affine for every OD-pair and hence differentiable. Note that this is not
a contradiction to the piece-wise linearity of the price function with respect to distance, see Fig. 1. As a second example, we
mention the public transport prices for the city of Potsdam; they are linear or constant and therefore also differentiable, see
Section 3 for detailed examples.
A demand function dist(x) measures the number of passengers that travel from s to t with travel choice i, depending on
the fare vector x. The total demand for serving OD-pair (s, t) ∈ Dwith public transport is
dC
′
st (x) :=

i∈C′
dist(x).
As a sum, the function dC
′
st (x) is non-increasing. For a single specific travel choice i, however, the demand d
i
st(x) does
not necessarily have this property because of substitution effects between different travel choices. In our application, the
demand functions are differentiable.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Section 2.1we specify a concrete demand function. Fare planning
models based on these definitions are proposed in Section 2.2. The models are calibrated with respect to data for the city of
Potsdam in Section 2.3.
2.1. Demand functions
Akey feature of our fare planningmodels are the demand functions dist . In this sectionwepresent demand functions based
on a discrete choice logit approach, see [3]. A logit type demand function constitutes an acceptable compromise between
model accuracy and computability, namely, it allows to include several characteristics (e.g., travel time or convenience of
the alternative) that are relevant when choosing a transportation mode while (using the Gumbel distribution to model
passenger behavior) producing a closed formula expression for the demand function.
Assume that a passenger traveling from s to t performs a random number Xst ∈ Z+ of (s, t)-trips during the time horizon
T , i.e., Xst is a discrete random variable. We assume that Xst is upper bounded by N , the maximum number of trips during T .
Associate with each travel choice (a, k) ∈ C, i.e., k travels using alternative a, a utility
Ua,kst (x) = V a,kst (x)+ νast ,
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whichdepends on the fare vector x. Here,V a,kst is a deterministic or observable utility, and νast is a randomutility or disturbance
term, which we assume G(η, µ) Gumbel distributed with η = 0. In our models, the deterministic utility is measured in
monetary units and always includes the price function for public transport, i.e.,
V a,kst (x) = W a,kst − pa,kst (x). (1)
Here, W a,kst is a constant that subsumes all deterministic utilities that do not depend on fares such as travel time. Since
passengers would prefer to pay less for traveling, we consider the price function as a ‘‘disutility’’ and subtract the term in
the utility function. Note also that the utilitiesW a,kst and the prices p
a,k
st depend on the route that the passengers use to travel
from s to t by alternative a, and that this route is different for every OD-pair and travel alternative. To simplify notation, we
write da,kst (x) for the number of passengers traveling k times during T with alternative a from s to t and similarly p
a,k
st (x) for
the price of these trips.
In logitmodels one assumes that each passenger takes the alternative ofmaximal utility. Using standard logit techniques,
see [3], it follows that the expected demand can be computed via an explicit formula as
da,kst (x) = ρst · e
µV a,kst (x)
b∈A
eµV
b,k
st (x)
· P[Xst = k], (2)
where ρst is the total number of passengers that want to travel from s to t . The last term computes the probability that
passengers from s to t make k trips, while the middle term corresponds to the probability that they use alternative a. The
formula expresses the expected demand over the probability spaces for Xst and the disturbance terms νast .
Note that da,kst (x) is continuous and even differentiable if the deterministic utilities V
a,k
st (x) have this property. This is, for
instance, the case for affine deterministic utilities, see Sections 2.3 and 3.
2.2. Fare planning models
We now propose five fare planning models that capture different aspects and objectives, reflecting the respective
planning goals.
2.2.1. Maximizing revenue
The first and most simple model maximizes revenue:
(Max-R) max

(s,t)∈D

i∈C′
pist(x) · dist(x)
s.t. x ∈ P.
Here, we assume that the fare vector x lies within a polyhedron P ⊆ Rn+ in the nonnegative orthant; P can be used to specify
certain passenger interests or political goals, e.g., by stipulating upper bounds on the fare-variables; see also Section 2.3.1
for an application. Note that the model does not consider costs, that is, it assumes a fixed level of service. This is of course
a simplification, however, not a completely unreasonable one if the expected or intended changes in demand and/or fares
are small.
Max-R is similar to the revenue maximization model of Nash [18]; our model, however, also includes different ticket
types, and it captures substitution effects between public transport and car travel, see the definition of the demand function
in Section 2.1. Therefore the ‘‘monopolistic exploitation’’ (asmentioned by Nash in case of revenuemaximization) is limited.
In fact, as the model includes a non-public transport alternative with constant utility, all passengers will choose this
alternative when prices become sufficiently large. In Eq. (2), this alternative produces a constant term in the denominator,
whereas the terms for the public transport alternatives become zero for rising fares. Therefore, the demand for public
transport tends to zero.
2.2.2. Maximizing profit
The second model, Max-P includes operating costs for lines. In principle, one would like to include a complete line
planning model, see, e.g., [4]. Due to the complexity of line planning, however, we can at present only deal with a simplified
version that plans frequencies of fixed lines. More precisely, we consider a pool L of lines, i.e., paths in the network, and
associated continuous frequencies fℓ ≥ 0 for each line ℓ ∈ L. We assume that the lines are symmetric and fℓ is the frequency
for the back and forth direction. We denote by f the vector of all frequencies. The operating costs for a line ℓ ∈ L are cℓ · fℓ,
where cℓ ≥ 0 is a constant that depends on the length of the line. The transport capacity of line ℓ ∈ L is κℓ · fℓ, where κℓ > 0
is a given vehicle capacity.
Under these assumptions, we can express the maximization of profit, i.e., revenue minus costs. It is not unusual that the
costs for transporting passengers in public transport are higher than the revenue from ticket sales. We therefore include a
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fixed subsidy S in the model, that covers a part of the line operation costs:
(Max-P) max

(s,t)∈D

i∈C′
pist(x) · dist(x)− z
s.t.

ℓ∈L
cℓ · fℓ − S ≤ z
(s,t)∈D
e∈Pst
dC
′
st (x) ≤

ℓ:e∈ℓ
fℓ · κℓ ∀e ∈ E
x ≥ 0
z ≥ 0
f ≥ 0.
Since the objective maximizes −z, the first constraint, together with the inequality z ≥ 0, guarantees that z is the
maximum of cost minus subsidy and zero. Therefore, the subsidy can only be used for compensating costs. If the subsidy is
zero, then z is equal to the cost. Hence, the model maximizes profit. The second set of constraints guarantees that sufficient
transportation capacity on each arc is provided. That is, the line frequencies will be enlarged until all passengers that are
attracted by a certain fare can travel on a shortest path. This is what passengers expect.
Glaister and Collings [10] consider a similar model for profit maximization with a constraint that imposes a lower bound
on the passenger-miles. They mention that this is dual to a model that maximizes passenger-miles subject to a budget
constraint, which we will consider next. Instead of considering a detailed network with lines and OD-pairs, Glaister and
Collings’s model works on a coarser level of transport modes and can be solved analytically. Their demand functions are
formulated in terms of constant elasticities instead of using a logit model.
2.2.3. Maximizing demand
ModelsMax-R andMax-P aim at improving the profitability of a public transport system.We now consider threemodels
that also cover social objectives. The goal of the first model is to maximize the number of passengers using public transport
subject to a budget constraint.
(Max-D) max

(s,t)∈D
dC
′
st (x)
s.t.

(s,t)∈D

i∈C′
pist(x) · dist(x)+ S ≥

ℓ∈L
cℓ fℓ
(s,t)∈D
e∈Pst
dC
′
st (x) ≤

ℓ:e∈ℓ
fℓ · κℓ ∀e ∈ E
x ≥ 0
f ≥ 0.
In case of zero subsidies S, the objective is to maximize the number of transported passengers such that the costs are not
larger than the revenue; in case of positive subsidies, the costs should not be larger than revenue plus subsidy. The subsidies
could also be negative. In that case, public transport has to yield a surplus.
The literature (e.g. [18,10]) usually maximizes demand in terms of passenger miles. In contrast to this objective, our
approach maximizes the number of passenger that use public transport.
2.2.4. Maximizing welfare
Fare planning models in the literature often consider the maximization of a social welfare function. In general, the social
welfare is the sum of a producer benefit and a user benefit. We consider the producer benefit as the profit, i.e., revenueminus
cost. In the economic literature, the user benefit is the difference between the generalized price the user is willing to pay,
i.e., his maximal utility, and the actual generalized price, i.e., the utility of the given price. More precisely, we define the user
benefit for our setting according to Definition 1. Note that the generalized price includes parts that do not arise from fares,
but that are measured in (scaled) monetary units and hence change the willingness to pay. In case of a single fare variable
and an invertible demand function, the user benefit can be easily derived by computing an integral.
Definition 1. The total user benefit for given fares x is
B(x) :=

(s,t)∈D
N
k=1
ρst · P[Xst = k] · E

max{max
a∈A′
Ua,kst (x)− max
b∈A\A′
Ub,kst (x), 0 }

.
We sum the benefit for one usermultiplied by the number of users for all OD-pairs and the number of trips. The difference
between the utilities of the best public transport alternative (with maximal utility) and the best non-public transport
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alternative gives the largest generalized price (utility) that a passenger is willing to pay for any public transport alternative,
before switching to a non-public transport alternative. The maximumwith 0 excludes passengers that choose a non-public
transport alternative (i.e., when the difference of the utilities is negative). Since the utilities are random variables, we take
the expectation.
Thedefinition of the user benefitB(x) looks difficult at first sight, butwewill shownow that it can be computed efficiently.
This result is the basis for the numerical solution of the welfare models.
Lemma 2. Let I be a finite nonempty set and Ui, i ∈ I , be Gumbel distributed random variables with parameters (ηi, µ) for i ∈ I .
Let ∅ ≠ I ′ ( I . Then
E

max{max
i∈I ′
Ui −max
i∈I\I ′
Ui, 0 }
 =

∞
n=1
(−1)n−1
n2
· en· αβ if − α
β
≥ 0
π2
4
+

α
β
2
2
−
∞
n=1
(−1)n−1
n2
· e−n· αβ otherwise,
where α = 1
µ
ln

i∈I ′ eµηi − 1µ ln

i∈I\I ′ eµηi and β = 1µ .
Proof. Let
U := max
i∈I ′
Ui −max
i∈I\I ′
Ui.
Due to the properties of the Gumbel distribution, we know that U is logistically distributed with parameters (α, β). For
g(x) = max{x, 0} and a random variable X with density function f (x) it holds
E[g(X)] =
 ∞
−∞
g(x)f (x) dx =
 ∞
0
x f (x) dx.
Inserting the density function for the logistic distribution we obtain
E[max{U, 0}] =
 ∞
0
x · e
− x−α
β
β ·

1+ e− x−αβ
 dx.
The substitution x = α + βξ and partial integration yields ∞
0
x · e
− x−α
β
β ·

1+ e− x−αβ
 dx = β  ∞
− α
β
ln(1+ e−ξ ) dξ .
For− α
β
≥ 0, the last integral can be expressed in terms of the Epstein zeta function ∞
− α
β
ln(1+ e−ξ ) dξ =
∞
n=1
(−1)n−1
n2
· en· αβ .
For− α
β
< 0, we get
 ∞
− α
β
ln(1+ e−ξ ) dξ = π
2
4
+

α
β
2
2
−
∞
n=1
(−1)n−1
n2
· e−n· αβ . 
Note. The expressions in Lemma 2 can be used to evaluate the user benefit to any desired precision; we used 20 terms in
our computations. The derivatives can be calculated directly by differentiating the integral.
We now consider twomodels that optimizewelfare objectives. InmodelMax-B, which is similar toMax-D, wemaximize
the user benefit for public transport, subject to a budget constraint.
(Max-B) max B(x)
s.t.

(s,t)∈D

i∈C′
pist(x) · dist(x)+ S ≥

ℓ∈L
cℓ fℓ
(s,t)∈D
e∈Pst
dC
′
st (x) ≤

ℓ:e∈ℓ
fℓ · κℓ ∀e ∈ E
x ≥ 0
f ≥ 0.
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Fig. 2. Passenger trips classified according to travel times (left) and travel distances (right) for car (x-axis) and public transport (y-axis). The darker the
color of a point, the more passengers travel with the corresponding travel time and distance.
Note that, without the budget constraint, the user benefit would be maximal for zero fares, since the utilities for non-
public transport alternatives are independent of the fare variables and the utilities for public transport alternatives are
non-increasing for increasing fares.
In model Max-S, we maximize the social welfare as a sum of the user benefit and the profit of the public transport
company.
(Max-S) max B(x)+

(s,t)∈D

i∈C′
pist(x) · dist(x)−

ℓ∈L
cℓ · fℓ
s.t.

(s,t)∈D
e∈Pst
dC
′
st (x) ≤

ℓ:e∈ℓ
fℓ · κℓ ∀e ∈ E
x ≥ 0
f ≥ 0.
2.2.5. Solving the models
All of the abovemodels are nonlinear programs involving |D|·N ·|A′| demand functions, up to |E| capacity constraints, and
up to n+ |L| variables; recall N as the maximum number of trips during T and n as the number of fares. In our application,
there will be up to 6830 × 60 × 3 (≥1 million!) demand functions, 775 capacity constraints, and up to 42 variables. The
models are therefore not large scale with respect to the number of variables or constraints. However, they include a very
large number of complex demand functions that encode the entire information on passenger behavior. In fact, these demand
functions are a source of numerical trouble: comparing with Eq. (2), we see that large (negative valued) disutilities lead to
small terms in the nominator and the denominator. To stabilize the computation of these fractions, we shifted the ranges of
all utilities by+300.
Using this trick, the state-of-the-art nonlinear programming package GAMS 2.50/Distribution 22.2, and the NLP-solver
snopt [9] we were able to solve all our instances on an Intel Quad Core 2.93 GHz computer with 16 GB of main memory.
It turns out that Max-R is easy, while the others have computation times of up to three days, see Table 3 for detailed
computation times. The most challenging instances arose from models Max-B and Max-S: they are numerically not well
behaved, but we were able to compute locally optimal solutions using Lemma 2.
2.3. Data and parameter specification
The data that we use in our computations has been collected in 2005 for the city of Potsdam, Germany. It was provided
to us in a joint project by the local public transport company ViP Verkehrsgesellschaft GmbH and the software company
IVU Traffic Technologies AG. The data consists of the public transport network of Potsdam, which contains 36 lines and 775
edges, and a demand matrix for one day, which contains 6830 origin–destination pairs with positive demand.
Of the 209315 trips in this matrix, 66 503 were done using public transport and 142812 using a car. Fig. 2 illustrates
the distribution of these trips according to travel time and distance, for public transport and car. On average, trip distances
for public transport are similar to those for car travel, whereas the travel time for public transport is nearly three times as
high as the average travel time for the car (travel time for cars does not include additional times for parking etc.). Another
observation is that most passengers travel on connections with short distances, between 0.5 and 10 km, for both public
transport and car.
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Table 1
Price and cross-price elasticity values for the Potsdam demand functions. Each entry in the
table gives the demand elasticity for the travel alternative represented by the column if the
fare of the alternative represented by the row is raised by 5%.
Single ticket Monthly ticket Car
Single ticket −0.72 0.21 0.12
Monthly ticket 0.25 −0.93 0.15
2.3.1. Fare system and utility function
The public transport network of Potsdam is divided into three zones A, B, and C. Zones A, B and zones B, C, respectively,
form tariff zone 1. All three zones together constitute tariff zone 2. Let us denote by Zj, j ∈ {1, 2} the set of all OD pairs
(s, t) ∈ D within tariff zone j. We consider the following three travel alternatives for each tariff zone: ‘‘single ticket’’ (S),
‘‘monthly ticket’’ (M), and ‘‘car’’ (C), i.e., we have A = {S,M, C} and A′ = {S,M}. Since we want to compare single and
monthly tickets, we consider a time horizon of 30 days.
For each tariff zone j ∈ {1, 2}, the prices for public transport involve two fares: xSj is a single ticket fare and xMj the
monthly ticket fare (that has to be paid once a month and authorizes to use all public transportation modes such as bus,
tram, city railroad, regional traffic, ferry; cf. Table 2). We write x = (xS1, xM1 , xS2, xM2 ) and set the prices for alternatives single
and monthly ticket to
pS,kst (x) = xSj · k and pM,kst (x) = xMj , ∀ (s, t) ∈ Zj, j = {1, 2},
respectively. In 2005, the prices for single ticket and monthly ticket were 1.45e and 32.50e for tariff zone 1 and 2.20e and
49.50e for tariff zone 2. For alternative ‘‘car’’, the price is the sum of a fixed cost Q and distance dependent operating costs
q, i.e.,
pC,kst (x) = Q + q · ℓcst · k;
here, ℓcst denotes the shortest distance between s and t in kilometers for a car. We set Q = 100 e and q = 0.1 e. Note that
pC,kst (x) ≡ pC,kst is independent of x.
The construction of the tariff zones allows the following: to travel in tariff zone 2, one can either buy a ticket for tariff
zone 2 or two tickets for tariff zone 1 (one ticket for zones A, B and one ticket for zones B, C). To avoid unrealistic fares, we
impose the following conditions on fares:
xS1 ≤ xS2 ≤ 2 · xS1 and xM1 ≤ xM2 ≤ 2 · xM1 .
The utilities for the travel alternatives are set up using affine functions for prices and travel times. They depend on the
number of trips k. Let tcst be the time for traveling from s to t with alternative car in minutes and tst the time for traveling
with public transport. We set j = {1, 2}:
US,kst (x
S
1, x
M
1 , x
S
2, x
M
2 ) = −xSj · k− δ · tst · k+ νSst , (s, t) ∈ Zj
UM,kst (x
S
1, x
M
1 , x
S
2, x
M
2 ) = −xMj − δ · tst · k+ νMst , (s, t) ∈ Zj
UC,kst (x
S
1, x
M
1 , x
S
2, x
M
2 ) = −(Q + q · ℓcst · k)− δ · tcst · k+ yst + νCst .
Here, δ is a parameter to express the travel time in monetary units; we use δ = 0.1, i.e., 10 min of travel time are worth
1e. In our first computations, we noticed that the behavior of the car users could not be explained solely in terms of travel
time and costs. We therefore introduced an extra utility yst for each OD-pair that is supposed to indicate a ‘‘convenience’’
of using a car. We computed yst such that the 2005 fares, inserted in our demand function, resulted in the 2005 demand for
public transport and car, respectively. This convenience utility yst takes an average value of 83e per month.
As usual in logit models, we use disturbance terms νast that are Gumbel distributed. We set the parameters of the Gumbel
distribution G(η, µ) to η = 0 and µ = 1/30. The (discrete) probabilities for the number of trips Xst are defined by the
function 1− 11500 ·(k−30)2 and then normalized. The resulting probabilities do not depend on a particular OD-pair (s, t) ∈ D
and are centered around 30 in an interval from 1 to N := 60; see the left of Fig. 3.
2.3.2. Elasticities and costs
As a consistency check, we approximated price elasticities of the resulting demand functions as follows. Taking the 2005
fares, we increased the fare for one ticket type by 5%, while keeping the fare of the other ticket type and the price for the
car fixed. Table 1 shows the resulting price and cross-price elasticities. A study of the Verkehrsverbund Berlin–Brandenburg
(VBB) of December 2006 [26] reports price elasticities for single tickets between −0.43 and −0.76, which is similar to our
results. For monthly and other long-term tickets, price elasticities between−0.03 and−0.34 are reported. In our model, the
price elasticity for the single ticket is higher than the price elasticity for the monthly ticket. This means that the users of the
monthly ticket are more price sensitive than the users of the single ticket. This is due to the fact that we assume that every
passenger has access to a car, resulting in a higher competition between car and monthly ticket than in reality. Actually,
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Table 2
Transportation capacities and costs (in e/km).
Modes Bus Tram City railroad Regional traffic Ferry
cℓ—capacity (in pass.) 57 114 536 600 39
κℓ—costs (in e/km) 4.5 7.5 50 100 30
Fig. 3. Left: Probability distribution for the number of trips Xst . Right: Demand function for single/monthly ticket fare system for Potsdam (tariff zone 2).
many passengers who buy long-term tickets do not own a car and are therefore less price sensitive. We do, however, not
consider this aspect, because no appropriate data was available.
We finally set line operation costs, depending on the modes bus, tram, city railroad, regional traffic, and ferry, and the
transportation capacity of a line as listed in Table 2.
With the stated data, parameters, and assumptions we computed the revenue and the cost by fixing the fares in model
Max-P to the 2005 fares. The revenue is around 2086317e in total, the costs are 1 914519e. This would mean that no
subsidies are needed. Note, however, that our model considers only operating costs, i.e., the overall costs can be (much)
higher in reality.
3. Analyzing fare systems
In this section we discuss and analyze a number of fare planning scenarios for the public transportation system of
Potsdam, using the proposed five fare planning models. We first investigate fare changes in the existing system, i.e., the
influence of fares on different objectives such as demand, revenue, cost, and social welfare, see Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Models
Max-P andMax-D allow us to analyze subsidies in Section 3.3. Going one step further, we address extensions of the existing
fare system and entirely new fare systems. Computing optimal fares, we investigate the advantages of different fare systems
with respect to various objectives.
3.1. Basic example—maximizing revenue
We start by illustrating our approachwith a detailed discussion of the basic revenuemaximizationmodelMax-R, applied
to the existing fare system of Potsdam. The analyses for the following scenarios are similar, such that, hereafter, wewill only
state the results.
Inserting the demand function and the existing fare system, modelMax-R takes the following explicit form:
max
N
k=1
2
j=1

s,t∈Zj
ρst ·
xSj · k · eV
S,k
st (x) + xMj · eV
M,k
st (x)
b∈{S,M,C}
eV
b,k
st (x)
· P[Xst = k]
s.t. xS1 ≤ xS2 ≤ 2 · xS1
xM1 ≤ xM2 ≤ 2 · xM1
x ≥ 0.
Note that the objective function is differentiable.
The model produces the demand function shown on the right of Fig. 3 and the revenue function shown in Fig. 4. The
optimal single ticket fare for tariff zone 1 is 1.75e (up from 1.45e) and 1.98e for tariff zone 2 (down from 2.20e). The
optimal monthly ticket fare is 45.01e (currently 32.50e) for tariff zone 1 and 51.06e (currently 49.50e) for tariff zone 2.
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Fig. 4. Left: Revenue function for the single/monthly ticket fare system for Potsdam (tariff zone 2). Right: Contour plot of the revenue function. The optimal
fares for tariff zone 2 are xS = 1.98 e and xM = 51.06 e for modelMax-R.
Fig. 5. Results for optimizing the current fare system with single/monthly ticket using modelMax-R. Potsdam is subdivided into 86 districts; the size of
the circle in each district is proportional to the number of passengers which arrive at the district by car (Left) and public transport (Right).
Comparing the resulting revenue with the revenue for the current situation (which we also computed with our model, see
the endof Section 2.3), the revenue increases by around4% to 2165282e, and the demanddecreases by around14% to 57021
passengers. Hence, the improvement in revenue is relatively small compared with the loss in the number of passengers.
Fig. 5 shows Potsdam divided into 86 districts. The circles in the districts represent the number of passengers traveling
to this district from the other districts by car (left) and by public transport (right of Fig. 5), respectively. The figure illustrates
the importance of the car as a travel alternative, which amounts to 73% of the total traffic.
3.2. Comparing different models
This subsection is devoted to an analysis of the current fare system. We compute optimal fares for all five proposed
models. For this comparison, we consider the case of zero subsidies, i.e., we set S = 0 in those models that include
subsidies. The results are listed in Table 3. The first row of the table represents the 2005 solution.We canmake the following
observations:
◦ Compared to the current situation, the fares that maximize profit double – the increase in the single ticket fares is even
higher – and the demand is halved. Doubled fares lead to a five-fold increase in profit. In fact, revenue decreases slightly
while costs decrease dramatically. From an economical point of view, this is an appealing result; it might, however, not
be possible nor desirable to implement it in practice.
◦ The fares that maximize the demand are on a similar level as the 2005 fares. The demand can increase by around 6% only.
With respect to this objective, the current fares of Potsdam are quite well chosen.
◦ The fares of modelMax-B are similar to the fares of modelMax-D. There is only a slight difference between the two tariff
zones. ModelMax-B attracts more passengers for tariff zone 2.
◦ The revenue that results from demand maximization (Max-D) is higher than the revenue from profit maximization
(Max-P), i.e., the effect of modelMax-P is achieved by minimizing costs.
◦ For model Max-S we get zero fares. Obviously, the user benefit for zero fares is higher than the costs that are needed
to establish a free public transport system (with the current weighting of the objective). We discuss zero fares in more
detail in the next subsection.
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Table 3
Results for Potsdam providing a single ticket (xS ) and a monthly ticket (xM ). The computations are for the case of zero
subsidies. (The costs for modelMax-R are computed ex post. They are not part of the computation process.)
xS xM Revenue Demand Cost CPU secs
2005 1.45 32.50 1831499 60627.0 1914519 –2.20 49.50 254818 5876.0
Max-R 1.75 45.01 1909843 51038.8 1662187 401.98 51.06 255439 5982.3
Max-P 3.96 64.66 1613537 29819.2 912876 4507.93 87.59 170892 2310.8
Max-D 1.09 32.42 1771871 64988.3 2027026 2,7002.09 53.03 255154 5783.7
Max-B 1.11 32.14 1775660 64788.5 2030931 2856001.92 52.62 255271 5970.8
Max-S 0.00 0.00 0 100625.6 3266290 4,3000.00 0.00 0 11286.3
Fig. 6. Comparing modelsMax-R andMax-P: The lighter the edge/point is colored the smaller the quotient of demand for modelMax-P and demand for
modelMax-R is, i.e., the less passengers travel on the arc or OD-pairs with the related travel time for car and public transport with fares of modelMax-P
compared with fares of modelMax-R.
ModelsMax-R andMax-P cover the efficiency of public transport from a purely economical point of view.ModelMax-S adds
interests of passengers in terms of user benefit. ModelsMax-D andMax-B focus solely on the passenger’s point of view by
optimizing the modal split and the user benefit, respectively. Which model is adequate for a particular application depends
on political, social, operational, and technical side-constraints. In this unclear situation, optimization can bring quantitative
arguments into the discussion and help to make a well-founded decision.
We finally take a more detailed look at our results by not only considering aggregate objectives, but by investigating
changes in travel behavior. For this purpose, we compare a low fare and a high fare scenario, namely, the solutions ofmodels
Max-R and Max-P. Their only difference is that Max-P includes costs. The left of Fig. 6 illustrates the resulting passenger
distributions. An edge is colored dark if the flows for model Max-P and model Max-R are similar. The bigger the relative
difference between the flows, the lighter the edge is colored. We can see that the changes in the demand are quite similar
for all edges. The right of Fig. 6, however, shows that there is no simple pattern that explains the relative changes in demand
for different OD-pairs. To predict how the passengers behave if the fares are doubled, all aspects that pertain to the utilities
of car and public transport have to be considered, that is, in our case, travel time, lengths, and the extra utility for the car.
This is an example of the ‘‘network effect’’ that was mentioned in the introduction. We have no simple explanation for it, it
just reflects the complexity of the network. And it suggests that simplistic approaches to fare planning are not appropriate.
3.3. Including subsidies
We now study the effect of subsidies by computing optimal fares for models Max-P and Max-D, setting subsidies to
S = 1 000 000 e. The results are shown in Table 4.
For the profit maximization model Max-P, the subsidies are used to establish a level of service with a cost of exactly
1 000000e, which is a bit more than the cost of Max-P in the 0-subsidy case. Actually, the subsidized variant of model
Max-P amounts to a revenue maximization under the restriction that the costs are equal to the amount of subsidies. In
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Table 4
Effects of 1 000000e of subsidies: Maximizing the profit for the current fare system of single ticket (xS ) and
monthly ticket (xM ).
xS xM Revenue Demand Cost
2005 1.45 32.50 1831499 60627.0 19145192.20 49.50 254818 5876.0
Max-P 3.46 62.23 1683464 32560.5 10000006.93 83.25 183202 2597.7
Max-D 0.57 18.98 1293622 80034.0 25274311.13 37.95 233809 7651.9
Fig. 7. Single/monthly ticket fare system: Left: The dependency between subsidy and total demand for themodel maximizing the demand (Max-D). Right:
Dependency between global subsidy and subsidy for an additional passenger.
the current situation, where public transport can be operated without extra money, it does not seem to be reasonable to
consider subsidies in combination with the aim of maximizing a profit.
In the demandmaximization case, the fare for the single ticket for tariff zone 1 ismore than halved, and all other fares are
reduced by around 25%–45%. The demand increases by around 21183 passengers, which is 32%more than the 2005 demand
and around 24%more than for the zero-subsidy case. This gives rise to the questionwhether there is a certain ‘‘best’’ amount
of subsidies. We therefore investigate how different subsidies influence the modal split.
We computed the solutions for model Max-D for 20 different values of subsidies between zero and 5000000e. The
results are plotted on the left of Fig. 7. They show the dependency between subsidy and total demand. One can see that
indeed the demand increases for rising subsidies. The marginal increase gets smaller and smaller and becomes zero for a
subsidy higher than 3200000 e. In fact, this amount of subsidy is needed to establish a service with zero fares. This would
result in around 112000 passengers using public transport. In total, there are 209315 passengers (by car or public transport).
Around 97000 passengers do not change to public transport even in case of zero fares. For these passengers the convenience
of the car or its shorter travel time are more important than costs.
The literature on zero fares in public transport, e.g., [2,23], is ambiguous. In some cases the demand for public transport
increased by extremely large amounts when switching to zero fares. Often, this increase is due to additional traffic by
passengers that used a bike orwent by foot before. Because such substitution effects are not considered in our computations,
the subsidies needed for zero fares could be to small. Our results agree with some outcomes of the mentioned studies in the
fact that only 55% of all passengers would use public transport instead of the car in case of zero fares.
The right of Fig. 7 shows the ratio of subsidies and passengers for different subsidies in an attempt to estimate ‘‘the value
of an additional passenger’’. According to this criterion, there is no best amount of subsidies, because the ratio of rising
subsidies and rising demand is nearly constant. In this case, one would therefore have to find a compromise between the
number of passengers using public transport and the amount of subsidies needed to induce this demand. If one wants to
have around 88000 passengers using public transport, one needs subsidies of around 1000000e. In this scenario, each
additional passenger costs about 60e per month.
3.4. Including a new ticket type
We are now going one step further and expand the current fare system by a third alternative for public transport. To this
purpose, we introduce a new travel alternative, in which the passengers have the opportunity to buy single tickets at a 50%
discount, if they pay a certain amount for one month. The resulting travel alternatives for each tariff zone are ‘‘single ticket’’
(S), ‘‘monthly ticket’’ (M), ‘‘reduced single ticket’’ (R), and ‘‘car’’ (C).
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Table 5
Results for optimizing a fare system including a single ticket, a monthly ticket, and a reduced single ticket
(xS is the single ticket fare, xM the monthly ticket fare, and xR is a basic fare for one month in order to buy
50%-reduced single tickets). The computations are for zero subsidies.
xS xM xR Revenue Demand Cost
2005 1.45 32.50 1831499 60627.0 19145192.20 49.50 254818 5876.0
Max-R 1.73 48.71 28.60 2477350 59298.0 17464961.98 55.43 31.12 321249 6751.4
Max-P 3.09 67.15 36.15 2205178 39262.7 11977945.86 89.15 42.34 225743 3019.1
Max-D 0.92 31.30 19.88 2175001 79646.2 24945321.76 51.40 29.07 319532 7222.0
Table 6
Results for the distance dependent fare system for Potsdam; xd is the distance fare per kilometer, xB is the
basic fare per month to buy a reduced ticket.
xB xd Revenue Demand Cost
Max-R 27.34 0.26 1901102 59673.9 1456154
Max-P 33.30 0.65 1568256 33989.0 728189
Max-D 20.68 0.18 1822608 71253.3 1822608
Max-B 15.44 0.21 1797885 70949.2 1797885
Max-S 0.00 0.00 0 111911.9 3266291
The prices for public transport involve three fares for each tariff zone j ∈ {1, 2}, the two fares xSj and xMj for single and
monthly tickets as in the current fare system, and a basic fare xRj that has to be paid once a month in order to buy reduced
single tickets. We write x = (xS1, xM1 , xR1, xS2, xM2 , xR2) and set the prices for alternative ‘‘reduced single ticket’’ to
pR,kst (x) = xRj +
1
2
xSj · k if (s, t) ∈ Zj.
The results for the corresponding revenue, profit, and demand maximizations are listed in Table 5. Compared with the
previous computations without the new ticket type (see Table 3), demand and revenue increase: The revenues for the
models Max-R and Max-P increase by around 30%, and the demand for model Max-D increases by around 23% as well.
The corresponding changes in passenger behavior can be classified according to the number of trips. Single ticket, reduced
single ticket, and monthly ticket are tickets for infrequent, frequent, and heavy users of the public transport, respectively.
Complex fare systemswithmany ticket typesmay alienate passengers. On the other hand, the computations clearly show
that demand is covered better. Therefore, more detailed fare systems can lead to an improvement in the profitability as well
as in the attractiveness of public transport.
3.5. Designing a new fare system
We now design an alternative system with distance dependent fares and compare it with the current fare system. We
consider the travel alternatives ‘‘standard ticket’’ (D), ‘‘reduced ticket’’ (B), and ‘‘car’’ (C).
In the new fare system, the prices for public transport involve two fares: xd, a distance fare per kilometer for standard
tickets, and xB, a basic fare that has to be paid once a month in order to buy reduced tickets with a 50% discount on standard
tickets. We write x = (xB, xd) and set the prices for alternatives standard and reduced ticket to
pD,kst (x) = xd · ℓst · k and pB,kst (x) = xB + 12 x
d · ℓst · k,
where ℓst denotes the shortest distance in the public transport network between s and t in kilometers. Table 6 shows the
optimal fares for the five models. We leave a comparison of the results for the new system to the reader and focus on
comparing the new fare system with the current one.
Table 7 compares revenue, demand, and costs. In all cases, the revenue produced by the fare systemwith single/monthly
ticket is more than 10% higher than for distance dependent fares. For costs the opposite holds. In all models the number
of passengers using public transport is higher for the distance dependent fare system than for the fare system with
single/monthly tickets. It increases by around 5% for models Max-R and Max-P, but only slightly for models Max-D and
Max-B.
Therefore, the single/monthly ticket fare system seems to be more operator friendly, whereas the distance dependent
fare system seems to be more customer oriented. This interpretation is corroborated by considering the results for user
benefit maximization. In fact, the user benefit for the single/monthly ticket fare system is 6 390682e and for the distance
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Table 7
Comparison of two fares systems single/monthly and distance dependent. The row ‘‘2005’’ shows the results
of the current situation.
Demand Revenue Costs
2005 66503.0 2072106 3597604
Max-R Single/monthly 57021.1 2165282 1662187Distance dependent 59673.9 1901102 1456154
Max-P Single/monthly 32130.0 1784429 912876Distance dependent 33989.0 1568256 728189
Max-D Single/monthly 70772.0 2027026 2027026Distance dependent 71253.3 1822608 1822608
Max-B Single/monthly 70772.0 2030931 2030931Distance dependent 70949.2 1797885 1797885
Max-S Single/monthly 111911.9 3266291 3266291Distance dependent 111911.9 3266291 3266291
Fig. 8. Comparing optimized single/monthly ticket fare system (SM) with the optimized distance dependent fare system (DD) for modelMax-D. Left: The
thickness of the arcs corresponds to the number of passengers traveling on this arc with single/monthly ticket. The arc is colored gray if more than 5%
passengers would use single/monthly ticket fare system compared to the distance dependent one; the arc is colored black if the relation is the other way
round and light-gray if the difference is smaller than 5%. Right: Dark colored points imply that more passengers travel with the distance dependent fare
system. Light colored points imply higher usage of the single/monthly ticket fare system.
Table 8
Number of passengers using single/monthly ticket and a distance dependent
ticket, respectively, depending on the distances of the OD-pairs.
Distance
(km)
Passengers for
single/monthly ticket
Distance dependent tickets
0–5 33794.1 38762.4
5–10 26702.9 24814.6
≥10 10275.0 7676.2
dependent fare system 6784373e, which is an increase of 6.2%. The social welfare is equal for both fare systems, because
it is optimal for zero fares.
The left of Fig. 8 illustrates travel behavior for both fare systems according tomodelMax-D. An edge is colored gray if the
number of passengers using this edge in the fare system with single/monthly tickets is at least 5% larger than the number
of passengers in the system with distance dependent fares. It is colored black if more than 5% passengers travel on this arc
with distance dependent tickets. The arc is colored light gray if the difference is smaller than 5%. The figure shows that,
on most arcs, the current fare system with single and monthly tickets induces a higher load. However, the overall number
of passengers traveling with the distance dependent fare system is slightly larger than the number of passengers traveling
with the single/monthly ticket fare system. This at first sight contradictory result is due the fact that distance dependent
fares are more attractive for passengers traveling on short distances, whereas the single/monthly ticket fare system is more
attractive for passengers traveling long distances, compare with Table 8. The right of Fig. 8 also shows that passengers with
short travel times are more attracted by the distance dependent fare system. This is not surprising, because short travel
times are often related with short distances.
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4. Conclusion
Fare planning with its interdependences between passenger behavior and costs is a complex optimization problem.
The analyses conducted in this paper show that setting fares can have a significant impact on passenger behavior and,
in particular, travel choice. Objectives ranging from cost recovery to welfare maximization can be handled in this way.
Important quantities such as elasticities are predicted correctly. We therefore believe that mathematical fare optimization
can be a valuable decision support tool for planners.
It seems that further progress in fare optimization requires the inclusion of combinatorial aspects of network planning,
e.g., to obtain a better model of the real cost structure, the choice of travel routes, transfer times, etc. This is, of course,
computationally difficult. A more direct impact can be achieved by improving the quality and the breadth of the data basis
and by improving the demand forecast models.
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